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1. INTRODUCTION
Prof. Hoffmann has given us a very clear paper that includes both a presentation of
important principles behind argumentative interchange as well as a concrete model and
application of how so-called "deep disagreements" can be approached. The concept of
"deep disagreement" as it has been recently formulated stems from a paper of R. Fogelin
in 1985. Its importance can be seen in the fact that twenty years later, the journal which
originally published the paper, Informal Logic, reprinted the paper along with articles
reacting to, and commenting on, the piece in a single commemorative issue.
Consequently, although there are many aspects of the debate arising from that piece
which could be discussed, the focus here is its potential impact on an important current
debate.
In his work Prof. Hoffmann has presented us with a concrete case that would
show what the limits of Fogelin's claim might be. Nothing is more effective in
philosophical debate than to have a particular instance against which a generalized claim
can be measured.
Hoffmann's detailed examination of the argumentative standoff
between the Israelis and the Palestinians is a fine example of confronting any student of
informal logic with a complex and protracted debate about a question that is of huge
importance, whether that question is considered from a political, moral, or spiritual point
of view. More importantly for our purposes today, however, this debate also can provide
the backdrop for examining both general questions pertaining to the nature of
argumentation as well as the specific queries pertaining to the diagramming method
proposed here. In the short time allotted for criticism, a number of intriguing insights
raised by Prof. Hoffmann will have to be left out of consideration. One can only
recommend that his paper be read in all its detail and studied for the many inviting
pathways it opens up in argumentation theory.
2. THE LIMITS OF L.A.M.
There are four items, however, that appear to me to be worthy of more intense scrutiny
here. The first three are of a more generic nature while the last focuses on the particular
example that occupies much of the diagramming section of the paper.
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First, the question arises whether the diagramming method, LAM (Logical
Argument Mapping) is the most perspicuous way of presenting the presuppositions at
work in the argumentation. In another presentation "Logical Argument Mapping (LAM):
A tool for problem solving, argumentation, deliberation, and conflict management,"
Hoffmann lays out the schemata for representing an argument. Some of the schemata are
more formal, e.g., truth tables, modus ponens, various types of syllogisms (disjunctive,
conditional, etc.), while others are more concerned with the "informal" side of the
propositional relationships in the argument, e.g., claim to warrant or reason. When
viewing the diagramming structure itself, however, one wonders what advance the
procedure has over some earlier forms of diagramming. Now, admittedly, Prof.
Hoffmann is making use of the work of thinkers such as Toulmin (as is clear from the
"informal" side just mentioned). The innovation provided by Toulmin has to be
counterbalanced by the distinctions that continue to influence the analysis of argument, as
pointed out by Prof. Johnson who writes, "…we have seen that terms such as 'logical
type,' not to mention 'argument' and 'premise' and 'modal term' all continue to do heavy
duty in Toulmin's theory (Johnson, 2000, pp. 355-8)….The lesson here seems to be that
we cannot just wipe the slate clean." 1 Now, Prof. Hoffmann is surely sensitive to the
history of philosophy in general and to the history of the discipline of argumentation in
particular. Indeed, his broader allusions to Kant and Pierce and others make this
unquestioned.
Still, when one considers the diagrammatic connective links between propositions
in the argument, it appears that some refinements proposed by earlier theorists are
overlooked. For instance, just to cite one example, Douglas Walton in his work
"Argument Structure: A Pragmatic Theory" describes the various types of relationships
between premises and conclusions and presents schematically the differences between
them. Thus, for instance, the distinctions of linked and convergent arguments, serial and
divergent arguments, among others, provide for what seems to be a more accurate and
revealing portrayal of the propositions constitutive of an argument. 2 Other textbooks
have tried to use as links lines that, by either being wavy or broken, would show
propositions that were conflicting with or irrelevant to the claim being made. There have
been other examinations of expansions to diagramming arguments. One thinks of
attempts to show how rebuttal or rebuttal of rebuttal can be represented in an argument 3
as well as of attempts to show how the argument schemes can be related to the Toulmin
schemes. 4
Second, the role of relativism in the resolution of conflicts is one that needs to be
addressed. One can readily admit that most arguments can never be all comprehensive in
their structural formulation so that all aspects are presented in such a way that assent to
objective truth is compelled on the part of any rational participant. Of course, there may
be some mathematical arguments of this sort. The clear exposition Hoffmann gives of
the Euclidean proposition that the sum of the interior angles of a triangle are equal to 180
degrees may be one of that sort. 5 However, as the author notes, even in such a case, one
1

Johnson 2005, pp. 223-224:
Walton 1996, ch. 3.
3
Slob 2005, p. 431.
4
Reed and Rowe 2005, p. 379.
5
Hoffmann 2004, pp. 299-301.
2

2

COMENTATARY ON MICHAEL H.G. HOFFMANN
has to consider the representational system in which the proof is delivered – e.g., the
proposition regarding 180 degrees for the interior angles simply will not hold in the case
of Riemannean geometry. Now one might want to say that mathematical truths might be
so relativized, but does one want to say the same about physical truths? One might adopt
a radical position here that fits in with what Hanson or Feyerabend might say, but do
most really want to accept such a position? More generally, someone like Putnam wants
to argue against the relativism that so easily can beset us.6 In the case of the moral issues
presented by the Palestinian-Israeli case so deftly sketched in Prof. Hoffmann's paper, can
we be content either with the relativity of the representational system for a given type of
geometry or with the – at best – futuristic, Peircean-type, promissory note of the
agreement of those engaged in the scientific enterprise? Prof. Hoffmann writes, "we
should not worry too much about the 'truth' of what we presuppose as real for a certain
time." 7 Is it possible to resolve debates that touch on profound human issues without
resorting to universal principles that transcend the moral relativism which the paper
seems to tolerate, even such relativism is not espoused therein outright? Prof. Hoffmann
clearly is sensitive to this issue. He has written a paper recently in which the issue of
relativism plays an important role. 8
Third, if in the 'final analysis' of an argumentation certain differing a priori
propositions are reached, i.e., conflicting propositions resting on beliefs that neither party
is willing to abandon (e.g., the Koran commands Jews be exterminated vs. every Jew is
entitled to live), does the diagramming process have anything to offer? Now, one might
claim, in a Peircean spirit, that there never really is a "final" analysis of an argument –
argumentation is an ongoing process without termination. In such a case, does LAM
effectively become just a technique offering false hope for a future resolution of a debate,
a resolution that will never really be forthcoming?
Fourth, there are some particularities of the individual argument used here that
might throw light on the power of the technique employed. Consider, for instance, on
page 22, the shared features in the argument: there are five "shared" premises. Three of
these seem to be factual, i.e., "Hamas is an Islamic movement," "Hamas propagates
violence," "Hamas' 1988 charter {maintains…?}"; the other two seem to be, for lack of a
better word, interpretive. [Perhaps, it would be better to speak of these having an
intentional embedding.] Now, one might ask: A). Is there a way of determining which
premises in an argument are factual and which are interpretive? B). If the factual ones
are non-disputed, what weight do they exercise in the argument vis-à-vis the interpretive
ones? Can they be considered as foundational in way that the others are not? Do the
factual ones have a "truth" that the others do not? C). If they are foundational, how does
this bear on a fact/value distinction and the overall grounding of moral imperatives
(whether they be general or more specific, e.g., "one ought not to trust those with a
commitment to violence"; "one ought not to trust the Hamas")? Does one not need, in the
end, to make an appeal in ethical disputes to some non-relativistic grounding for ethical
imperatives? Finally, D). Do not the two factually shared premises in this example
simply seem to be so trivially true to the divergence of positions, that their endorsement
by both parties hardly furthers the dialogue leading to a resolution of the conflict?
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